In this paper, we study how war affects happiness using data from the on-going conflict in Ukraine. Using a difference-in-difference design, we find that the average level of happiness declined substantially in areas that experience war directly, with the drop in happiness being roughly comparable to the loss of happiness a relatively well-off person would experience if he/she were to become a poor person. At the same time, despite the fact that the war in the East dominates the local media in Ukraine, respondents in other regions of Ukraine are about as happy as they were before the war.
Introduction
By now, there is a sizeable economics literature on the various ways wars affect the civilian population (see Blattman and Miguel (2010) for an early overview). Some of these papers focus on how war affects the labor market success of individuals. For example, Kondylis (2010) shows that people displaced during the war in Bosnia & Herzegovina are less likely to work relative to stayers, while Akbulut-Yuksel (2014) shows that German children who were at school-age during WW II and lived in cities heavily affected by bombing have lower labor market earnings, compared to those living in less affected cities. Similarly, Islam et al (2015) find that exposure to the conflict in Cambodia during primary school age decreased earnings of men, but not of women.
Others have studied how war affects health or education. Akbulut-Yuksel (2014) , for example, further shows that German children from heavily war-affected cities have less schooling, are shorter and have lower self-reported health satisfaction, while Akresh et al. (2011) show that children from heavily affected areas during the Eritrean-Ethiopion conflict have lower age-for-height scores compared to children from less affected areas. Similarly, Islam et al. (2015) find that children exposed to the conflict in Cambodia during primary school age have lower overall educational attainment.
Yet other studies focus on social and political outcomes. Grosjean (2014) , for example, using data from Eastern Europe, finds that victims of recent civil wars have reduced trust in central institutions and reduced generalized trust in other people, but also that they are more likely to actively participate in groups, or in collective actions, and to be member of political parties. In contrast, Coupe and Obrizan (2016) , using data from 2 cities that were heavily affected by the war in Eastern Ukraine, find that people who experienced physical damage were less likely to turnout in the election for the Ukrainian parliament. This paper adds to the above literature on the costs of war by estimating the impact of war on the happiness of civilians. There is a sizeable economics literature that uses subjective well-being indices as outcome measures (for overviews see, MacKerron, 2012 and Frey, 2012) . Subjective well-being indices have been used to assess the impact of disasters (the Fukujama nuclear disaster by Rehdanz et al. (2015) , the Chernobyl nuclear disaster by Danzer and Danzer (2016) , or Hurricane Katrina by Kimball et al. (2006) ), the impact of terrorism (in Europe by Frey et al. (2007) , in Israel by Romanov et al. (2012) ) or the impact of environmental pollution (for example, Weinhold (2013) on noise pollution or Welsch (2006) on air pollution). Using happiness as an outcome variable has the advantage that happiness is a broad outcome measure which proxies "utility" (Frey and Stutzer, 2002) and thus can encompass the various objective and tangible impacts of war like war's impact on unemployment, income, education or health.
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As far as we know, there are only four papers that provide empirical estimates of how wars affect subjective well-being.
2,3 Welsch (2008) uses cross-sectional data for 44 countries and shows that, as the intensity of the war (the number of victims per 1000 inhabitants) increases, the average happiness in a country goes down. Shemyakina and Plagnol (2013) , studying the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, find that, several years after the end of the war, people living in municipalities heavily affected by the war (as measured by the level of people killed or missing, the high level of damage to housing stock, or the number of refugees in the community) were not less satisfied with their life than people living in municipalities that were not heavily affected. However, people who live in houses that are still suffering from war damage or who still think a lot about the war were found to be less satisfied with life. Similarly, Djankov et al. (2016) find no significant effect of whether or not a respondent or her parents/grandparents was killed, injured or displaced during World War II on the respondent's life satisfaction in 2010. Finally, van Praag et al. (2010) show that Jews and Arabs, living in Israel, who were asked about their life satisfaction during or after the 34-day 2006 IsraelLebanese War did not have a significantly different level of life satisfaction from those asked about their happiness before the start of the war. 4 In this paper, we present a case study using data from Ukraine. By studying the Ukrainian data, we can add to the literature as we use individual level data at the time of the conflict (unlike Welsch
2008, who uses cross-country data, and unlike Shemyakina and Plagnol, 2013, or Djankov et al. (2016) who use data from several years after the conflict). Moreover, unlike these three previous studies, we have data from both before and during the conflict, enabling us to arrive at more trustworthy estimates of the impact of war on happiness. The study by van Praag et al. (2010) is closest to ours. They also have individual level survey data from before and during the conflict. But that study uses data from Israel where the population had already been experiencing violence and terrorism for many years and of a war that had only a limited number of victims in Israel, both factors which could explain the limited effect of war on happiness that they find. Our study, however, focuses on a country where, until the 2014 war, violence and terrorism had been rare (since World War II) and hence, the violence of war and the high number of casualties might have a much bigger impact.
Moreover, given that the violence of war in Ukraine is concentrated in the East of Ukraine, we can make a methodological contribution to this literature by using, as an identification strategy for the impact of war, a difference-in-difference methodology, comparing directly affected regions, before and during the war, to regions that experienced the war mainly through the media. Knowing to what extent war affects happiness is not only of interest from a purely academic point, it also has important real life implications, as happiness measures are likely to be strongly correlated with civilian morale. Civilian morale is important as it can affect the outcome of war time elections.
For example, Williams et al. (2010) find a significant negative effect of war on the vote share of incumbents, but only if the economy is doing bad. Similarly, the amount of war casualties has been shown to affect public opinion, policy positions of politicians and electoral outcomes (see for example, Koch, 2011) . 5 This is particularly relevant for the conflict in Ukraine, where observers have argued that Russia's involvement in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine aims to demoralize the population (see for example, Magda, 2015) , pushing the population to elect politicians who are more positively inclined towards closer cooperation with Russia. Our results suggest that there has been little demoralization so far, however.
Second, many veterans have problems reintegrating in civil life. According to one survey (Taylor et al., 2011) , 44% of post-9/11 U.S. veterans had difficulties readjusting to civilian life. The large number of suicides among Ukrainian soldiers (259 out of 1,294 non-combat deaths as reported in 5 One could question whether happiness affects electoral outcomes independent of the economic effects of war or casualities. As far as we know there is no study that actually investigates this issue, but Ward (2015) shows that in general, happiness has an effect on electoral outcomes, even after controlling for economic factors.
Ukraine Today (2016) ) suggests this is and will be an issue in Ukraine as well. Research has shown that communities can play an important role in the reintegration of veterans in civil life (Demers, 2011) , by minimizing the 'civic-military cultural gap', a gap which is likely to be perceived bigger if the society shows many outward signs of happiness. In Ukraine, veteran associations indeed try to explain to returning soldiers that 'peace -including dancing and the summer pleasures of barbecues -is what everyone is fighting for and not something by which somebody should be alienated ' (Kyiv Post, 2015) .
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II provides the background for the conflict in Ukraine. Section III provides the methodology and is followed by a discussion of estimation results in section IV. Section V concludes.
II. Background
To February 2015, the Minsk II ceasefire agreement was signed and since then the conflict has been more or less frozen, even though people continue to be killed and wounded on a daily basis at the front line.
The UN estimates that by mid-2015, about 8,000 people were killed, and about 18,000 injured, in the conflict. In addition, about 1.4 million people became 'internally displaced' (OHCHR, 2015) . By Mid May 2016, the casualty count had increased to about 9,400, with about 21,500 being injured, and about 1.78 million people being registred as internally displaced (OHCHR, 2016) . Source: Adapted from Sakhno (2015) . 6 Ukraine has 25 regions knowns as 'Oblasts'. KIIS surveys are not designed to be representative at the regional level. Hence, maps are provided only for illustrative purposes and average happiness levels in regions are only provided as an approximation. In 2014, the East of Ukraine was relatively happier, with the centre of Ukraine being the least happy, and the West of Ukraine being somewhere in between.
However by 2015, things change (see bottom figure 2 ). An important characteristic of the war in Ukraine is that, while the war dominates local media in the whole of Ukraine, the war has directly affected only a limited geographical area in the East of Ukraine. In particular, only the Donetsk and Lugansk regions (the two regions in the very East of Ukraine and on the far right side of the above maps) were affected by clashes between separatist forces and the Ukrainian military (see fig. 1 from Zhukov (2016) in the appendix).
In 2015, these two directly affected regions become the most unhappy regions of Ukraine and the West of Ukraine becomes the most happy region in Ukraine. As in 2014, the central regions of
Ukraine remain relatively unhappy and the regions in the East directly bordering the conflict remain fairly happy. The May 2013 survey shows fairly uniform levels of happiness, ranging from 49.8% to 63.1% of happy or rather happy respondents, across the four macro regions. From May 2013 to February 2014, when the revolution had started but the outcome was not clear yet, the percentage of happy or rather happy respondents increased everywhere from 1.4% to 8.2% and the largest increase happened in Donbas.
Things changed drastically by May 2015. On the one hand, in our sample, the overall share of happy or rather happy people dropped by 2% points. However, this modest average decline does hide substantial geographical variation in changes in happiness. In Donbas, which was directly affected by the war, the average share of happy respondents in 2015 went down to about one half of the share in 2014. Happiness decreased by 5.3% points in the three regions bordering Donbas. Finally, there were 3.7% points more happy respondents in the Centre and South of Ukraine, and 6.6% points more happy respondents in the West.
Of course, since different people enter the sample in different years, changes over time could just reflect changes in sample. In the next section, we therefore use regression analysis to study the determinants of happiness in Ukraine and further attempt to disentangle the effect of war, economics and politics.
III. Data and Methodology
Data come from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology is one of the major polling organizations in Ukraine, with a strong reputation for high quality surveys both among the Ukrainian public and among international organizations in Ukraine.
KIIS data have been used in many academic articles on Ukraine, for example, Lehmann et al. (2012) and the references therein. While in the literature on subjective well being, the terms 'happiness' and 'life satisfaction' are often used interchangeably (see Djankov et al. 2016, or Frey and Stutzer, 2002) , there is no one-to-one relationship between these two concepts. The May 2013 KIIS survey asked individuals both the 5-scale happiness question and a 5-scale life satisfaction question. The correlation between the answers 8 An online appendix provides descriptive statistics for covariates by regions and years. 9 As explained in the background section below, the Madian revolution took place in the period end of December -End of February. The 2014 survey took place mainly in early February with only 1.3% of the sample being surveyed after February 17 when the outcome of the revolution became clear. The war started in April 2014. 10 The appendix provides the distribution of respondents across happiness categories and years on these 2 questions is only 0.37. 11 Howell et al. (2012) Given that a dependent variable, based on the scaled happiness question, would be discrete, ordered and categorical, we could run an ordered probit model. 13 Instead, however, for our base model, we collapse categories into 2 categories, creating a 'Happy' dummy that is 1 if a respondent answers Yes or Rather Yes, and zero otherwise. We do this for 2 reasons. First, we will use a difference in difference methodology, a methodology that was developed for the case of linear models and is less suited to use in non-linear models like the ordered probit model. The reason for this is that in nonlinear models, the interpretation of interaction terms is controversial (see Ai and Norton, 2003 , Puhani, 2012 , Greene, 2010 and that non-linear models violate the common trend assumption of the difference-in-difference model (see Lechner, 2010) . In case of a binary dependent variable, we can 11 Gallup has a regular survey of about 1000 people in Ukraine that includes a life satisfaction question. The Gallup (2016) Importantly, given the recent Gallup surveys do not include the war affected East, the Gallup survey cannot be used for the analysis we do in this paper. 12 Overall, we exclude 262 observations out of 5,702 (or 4.6%) due to missing explanatory or dependent variables. In most cases missing and included observations have similar means and standard deviations except for excluded respondents being 5.2% points more likely to be male and 5.3% points less likely to have higher education. However, given the small share of missing observations (4.6%) and the fact that we control for gender and education we do not expect that missing observations substantially affect our results. An online appendix provides details. 13 Excluding the "Don't know" category.
use the linear probability model (LPM), with robust standard errors to capture heteroscedasticity, instead of the non-linear ordered probit model 14 .
Besides being a better fit to the difference-in-difference methodology, the linear probability model also has an expositional advantage, with the interpretation of the results being more straightforward as the linear probability model allows us to focus on a single probability, the probability a respondent considers her/himself happy, rather than having to discuss at each stage the probability of a respondent ending up in several happiness categories. Below in table 5, we also present results from an ordered probit model and show conclusions are similar to the LPM results.
We use the following linear probability model as starting point:
where Happy is the dummy that respondent i is Happy or Rather happy in year t, Xit are a set of control variables and D2015 is a dummy for the year 2015.
Assuming we capture all factors that are different between the 2015 and 2013/2014 surveys in Xit except for the war, the gamma coefficient will reflect how the war affected happiness in Ukraine.
Of course, war has affected different regions of Ukraine in a dramatically different way. As mentioned above, the military actions took place in only 2 regions in the East of Ukraine, Donetsk and Luhansk, which form together the '"Donbas" region. To capture this difference between regions we add a Donbas dummy to (1) as well as interact the dummy for Donbas with the Dummy for 2015. This gives us the following difference-in-difference model, which we can estimate using a linear probability model and robust standard errors In addition, we check how our difference-in-difference estimates change when we allow for additional explanations, other than the war, that could change the difference between Donbass and other regions between 2014 and 2015. Indeed, one could argue that what we capture so far, rather than just the impact of the war, is the more general impact of the change in power that followed the Maidan revolution, which lead to a changed economic situation and a war. We try to separate these effects, first focusing on alternatives that are based on changes in political situation, then focusing on alternative explanations that are based on changes in the economic situation.
In To capture these political changes we include additional control variables. While we do not have a consistent survey question about political preferences at the individual level, we can measure the political preference of the polling unit to which the respondent belongs using the official results of the elections in December 2012 and October 2014. 15, 16 Since what may matter for happiness is whether your political party is in power or not, we create a variable "Support for Government" which for 2013 and 2014 is the share of votes for the parties that supported the Yanukovych government, the Party of Regions and the Communist party, in the 2012 parliamentary elections. For the 2015 15 We do have a variable on preferred Presidential candidate if early elections were held now in all three waves (with proposed candidates changing over time). However, due to many undecided voters as well as those who would not vote or vote against all the sample side is substantially reduced to 2,852 respondents.
The main results are stable in this reduced sample and are reported in the Online Appendix. 16 The official results can be found at the official website of the Ukrainian Central Election Committee (2016).
survey, by which time these pro-Russian parties already had lost the majority in the 2014 parliamentary elections, we compute "Support for parties in power" as 1 minus share of votes for the Opposition block (the successor of the Party of Regions), the Party of Tyhypko and the Communist party in the 2014 elections. 17 To capture individual level differences, we further include a set of dummies reflecting whether a person considers herself/himself "Ukrainian only", "Russian only" or in between these two categories.
Next we focus on changes in the economy as an additional explanation. Even if no war had occurred, Ukraine would have gone through a period of economic hardship since, even before the war started, Ukraine was running out of exchange rate reserves which lead to a 50% devaluation of the local currency (from 8 Hryvnia per dollar to 12 Hryvnia per US dollar) and trade-relations between Ukraine and Russia became strained. Given the East of Ukraine is more oriented towards trade with Russia, and the West of Ukraine more oriented towards trade with Europe, economic changes might well have differed across regions, which might have lead to differences in the evolution of happiness across these regions. Indeed, surveys of the literature by Frey and Stutzer (2002) and Stutzer and Frey (2012) suggest that a person's economic situation affects one's happiness. To control for the economic situation of the respondents, we include a set of 11 dummies that capture the occupation of the respondent, including whether or not a person is unemployed. In addition, we include a set of dummy variables based on the answer to the question "Which statement best describes your household financial state?". In particular, "lacking [money] for food" is the base category, and other categories are [having] "enough [money] for food", "enough [money] for clothes", "can buy expensive things"
and "can afford anything". 17 We also checked whether, rather than being in power, political preferences themselves matter for happiness. Napier and Jost (2008) , for example, find that right wing orientation is correlated with higher life satisfaction in ten countries. To do this, we created a variable capturing "Pro-Russian party support" in a settlement, computed as the share of votes in the settlement for the Party of Regions and the Communist party in the 2012 elections as a measure of political preferences for the 2013 and 2014 sample years. For the 2015 sample year, we took the share of votes for the Opposition block, the Party of Tyhypko and the Communist party. This variable was never significant, however.
While, by including economic variables and political variables as explanatory variables, we control for additional explanations that can contribute to differences in changes in happiness across regions between 2014 and 2015, it is important to note that, at the same time, these variables also are likely to have been affected by the war too. This is especially true for the economic variables: after the war started, the Ukrainian currency continued to devaluate (from 12 Hryvnia per US dollar to about 25 UAH per US dollar) and the war destroyed lots of infrastructure in the East. To a lesser extent this is true for the political variables but even for these the war is likely to have contributed to the loss of support of pro-Russia parties. By including these variables that are endogenous to the war, we are likely to attribute some of the impact of the war to these channels, through which war affects happiness.
For this reason, we provide two sets of regressions below. In a first set of regressions, we use a set of largely exogenous characteristics as control variables including age, gender, indicators for vocational and higher education, and a dummy for respondents living in a city. These variables are traditionally used as control variables in subjective well-being regressions: women have been found to be have higher self-reported well-being than men (Graham and Chattopadhyay, 2013) , happiness has been found to vary with age (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2008) , more educated people have been found to have higher life satisfaction (Powdthavee et al., 2015) while residents of urban areas have been found to be have lower life satisfaction than people living in cities (Sørensen, 2014) . As we do not include political and economic variables in these regressions, one can argue that this difference-in-difference estimate is an upper bound on the effect of war on happiness in Ukraine.
In the second set of regressions, we include variables the values of which could have been affected by the additional explanations mentioned above (economic and political variables) but which, at the same time, are channels through which the war can affect happiness, and hence one can argue that the difference-in-difference estimate of these specifications represent a lower bound on the effect of war on happiness in Ukraine. Once we include these extra variables, the coefficient of war excludes the 'indirect' impact of war on happiness through the included economic and political control variables. The remaining impact from war can come through channels like the increased uncertainty about the future, the increased insecurity of living in a war zone and so on. in Ukraine older people tend to be less likely to be happy, while more educated people tend to be more likely to be happy. We find no significant effect of gender nor of rural/urban location.
IV. Econometric Analysis
Column (II) runs the regression presented in equation 2, which uses a difference-in-difference methodology to estimate the effect of directly experiencing war, by comparing the evolution in happiness in the war zone to the evolution in happiness in the areas that are not directly affected by the war. We find that people living in the war zone during the war in 2015 are about 30 percentage points less likely to be happy. To put this in perspective, this 30 percentage points difference in happiness is about twice the difference in happiness between a person with higher education and a person with at most high school education. We further find that before the war there was no significant difference between the war affected region and the other regions and we do not find a significant change in happiness outside the war zone in 2015. The results for the control variables are similar to the one reported earlier with the exception of the urban dummy which has now a significant and positive coefficient. Table 2 reports the coefficients of OLS regressions, with standard errors in brackets. We use robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit (settlement level). . * stands for significant at the 10% significance level, ** for significant at the 5% significance level and *** for significant at the 1% significance level. The base category is represented by a person who is female, lives in a rural area, has high school education or less, in 2013/14 outside the war zone. For column V, the omitted year is 2014. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 for respondents who answered happy or rather happy.
Column 3 and 4 give the results of splitting the sample in older and younger respondents, based on whether respondents are older or younger than the average age in the sample. The idea behind this regression is that younger people tend to be more mobile and hence the 'younger' sample is more at risk to sample selection bias than the 'older' sample. As a comparison of column 3 and 4 shows however, the coefficient of the interaction term, which reflects living in the war zone in 2015, is basically the same for the 'older' and the 'younger' sample, which goes against the idea that selection is driving our estimate of how war is associated with happiness.
Column V presents the results of the placebo test proposed in equation 3. In this test, we check whether the evolution in happiness between 2013 and 2014 already differed between the war zone and the other areas before the war started. If so, this would suggest that it is not the war that is driving our results. However, we find that the interaction term between the Donbass dummy and 2013 is not significant, while the interaction term between the Donbass dummy and 2015 is significant and of a magnitude similar to the one reported before. This supports our interpretation of the latter coefficient as reflecting how the war is associated with happiness. We further find again no evidence that other Ukrainian macroregions were less likely to be happy during the war time.
Next we introduce additional controls into our regression model to capture possible additional factors that could explain the drop in happiness in Donbas between the 2014 and 2015 survey. The most important potential confounding factor is the political changes that came with the Maidan revolution.
As explained in the methodology section, we add a variable at the settlement (sampling unit) level (percentage of support for the party in power, based on the most recent parliamentary elections) and one variable at the individual level (self identification as Russian or Ukrainian). Since there were no elections in 2014 in the six non-government controlled settlements in the Donetsk region, our sample is potentially decreased by 117 observations from the war affected region. In some specifications, we therefore impute these missing observations by using predicted values from a regression of 2014 election results on 2012 election results. Table 3 reports the coefficients of OLS regressions, with standard errors in brackets. We use robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit (settlement level). . * stands for significant at the 10% significance level, ** for significant at the 5% significance level and *** for significant at the 1% significance level. The base category is represented by a person who is female, lives in a rural area, has high school education or less, in 2013/14 outside the war zone. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 for respondents who answered happy or rather happy. We do not show the coefficients of the self-identification dummies which are all insignificant nor the coefficients of the various dummies describing the professional status of people which were insignificant except for self employed people and students who are more likely to be happy. We also do not show the coefficients for the dummy for the 4 people who answered they can afford everything and the dummy for the 12 people who answered they don't' know their financial status.
Column (I) of table 3, gives the results of a difference in difference regression with just exogenous factors, repeating column (II) of table 2 for comparison purposes.
Column (II) to (V) shows that introducing additional variables roughly halfs the coefficient of the interaction term, with people in the war affected zone being about 15% points less happy than other people. The interaction term now estimates the effect of the war net of any effects the war might have had on the political and economic variables. To put this 'net' war effect into perspective we can again compare the coefficient of the interaction term to the coefficients of some of the control variables.
Using the education variables as benchmark, we can see that the difference in happiness in the war zone is similar to or somewhat bigger than the difference in happiness between a person with at most high school education and a person with higher education. Using variables reflecting the financial situation of a respondent, the loss in happiness associated with living in the war zone is similar to the loss of happiness when a relatively rich person (that is, according to Ukrainian standards, somebody who can afford clothes) becomes relatively poor (not enough money for food).
Note that the main reason for the halving of the coefficient of the war impact interaction coefficient is the inclusion of the variable that captures support for the parties in power. The Maidan revolution moved political power from the East to the West, which also moved happiness from the East to the West. The coefficient estimates suggest that this political effect is similar to our estimate of the net war effect. Table 4 repeats the check for selection bias and the placebo test for the specification with additional control variables and imputed election results. Table 4 reports the coefficients of OLS regressions, with standard errors in brackets . We use robust standard errors, clustered at the sampling unit (settlement level). * stands for significant at the 10% significance level, ** for significant at the 5% significance level and *** for significant at the 1% significance level. The base category is represented by a person who is female, lives in a rural area, has high school education or less, in 2013/14 outside the war zone, with not enough money for food, and not in support of the government. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 for respondents who answered happy or rather happy. We do not show the coefficients of the self-identification dummies which are all insignificant nor the coefficients of the various dummies describing the professional status of people which were insignificant except for self employed people and students who are more likely to be happy. We also do not show the coefficients for the dummy for the 4 people who answered they can afford everything and the dummy for the 12 people who answered they don't' know their financial status.
Compared to the specifications where we only used exogenous controls, adding additional variables So far, our analysis has been based on OLS regressions with a binary happy dummy as dependent variable, both because the difference-in-difference model is more suited to linear models and because interpretation is more straightforward. However, since the happiness question in the survey allowed for 5 answers, ranging between no (1) and yes (5), we present, in table 5, the results of an ordered probit regression with the choice of category as dependent variable.
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We present results for our two main specifications -the basic model with only exogenous variables (column II in Table 2 ) and the model including political and economic variables with imputations (column V in Table 3 ). We include all the variables from those models but for ease of presentation, we focus here on the results for the interaction term Donbas in 2015. We follow Norton, Wang and Ai (2004) to compute the average marginal effects, and bootstrap the standard errors. Norton, Wang and Ai (2004) .
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The results in table 5 are consistent with the results based on OLS as we again find that the living in 2015 in the war zone is associated with a large negative effect on the probability of being happy 22 .
Specifically, residents of Donbas in 2015 had an 18 to 27 percentage points lower chance of being happy. There is little change in the chance to be rather happy, but an increased chance of being unhappy, rather unhappy or being neither happy, nor unhappy. As before the reduced chance of being 20 We drop the 208 observations (or 3.8%) in the "Don't know" category. 21 The result based on Puhani (2012) are very close to these results. 22 We also find no significant change in happiness outside the war zone.
happy is bigger when we do control only for exogenous variables and smaller when we also control for the possibly endogenous variables.
Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we use individual level data from Ukraine to study the impact of war on happiness. We find that, despite a war that killed thousands and injured tens of thousands, overall happiness in Ukraine has changed little since the start of the war, as compared to the years before the conflict.
Disaggregating the data geographically and using a difference-in-difference design, we further show that the war is associated with a substantial decrease in happiness in the directly affected areas, with respondents outside the war zone demonstrating a much higher probability (roughly, from 15 to 30% points, depending on the assumptions one is willing to make) of feeling happy or rather happy. For comparison, such difference corresponds to moving from the financial state of "lacking money for food" to a financial state of being relatively well off (in the Ukrainian context).
The limited effect that the war has on the regions that did not experience war directly can be explained in different ways. First, one could argue that it shows that the more Europe-oriented Western regions feel little in common with the population in the pro-Russian Eastern regions and hence have little empathy with them. This is consistent with Duvanova et al. (2016) who, based on an analysis of communication patterns among Ukrainian users of a social networks found that the war separated
Ukrainains based on their geographic location rather than united them. The existence of volunteer networks and big numbers of civil society organizations to support Internally Displaced Persoms from the war affected areas (see OSCE, 2015) and the population in the occupied areas goes against this idea, however. Second, one could argue that because of the the duration of the conflict and the degree of media attention, the Ukrainian population outside the war zone has become 'desensitized'. Chronic exposure to violence can make people less sensitive as documented by De Choudhury et al. (2014) who found that the violence of the Mexican drug wars is associated with lowered affective responses in Twitter posts of Mexicans. Similarly, Tarabah et al. (2016) find that Lebanese children exposed to war violence are more likely to accept violence as normal.
The serious drop in the probability of being happy for people who live in the war zone is consistent with much of the existing literature that people who are more exposed to violence suffer more consequences. For example, Blattman and Annan (2010) find that in Uganda, youngsters' level of distress grows with each additional incident of violence experienced. Similarly, Dyregrov et al. (2002) find that children in Rwanda who were more exposed to violence show more signs of trauma.
This paper adds to the small academic literature on the impact of war on happiness by showing that the impact of war can be geographically localized, with big differences between directly affected areas and areas that experience the war only indirectly through the media, IDPs or veterans. We also Besides contributing to the academic literature, this paper also has a number of policy implications.
First, given the limited impact on happiness in regions further away from the violence, it is important to provide adequate psychological support to ex-combatants especially those coming back to their homes in these not directly affected regions, to avoid alienation and increase a successful transition from military to civil life. An important role might thus be played by veteran associations helping former combatants not to become alienated by the happy society, as is currently being done in Ukraine. Second, the kind of 'localized' war that takes place in Ukraine seems, at least in the short run, have had limited power in terms of demoralising people and thus is unlikely to dramatically affect electoral results. 
